The goal of a rumor source node in a social network is to spread its rumor to as many nodes as possible, while remaining hidden from the network administrator. On the other hand, the network administrator aims to identify the source node based on knowledge of which nodes have accepted the rumor (which are called infected nodes). We model the rumor spreading and source identification problem as a strategic game, where the rumor source and the network administrator are the two players. As the Jordan center estimator is a minimax source estimator that has been shown to be robust in recent works, we assume that the network administrator utilizes a source estimation strategy that probes every node within a given radius of the Jordan center. Given any estimation strategy, we design a best-response infection strategy for the rumor source. Given any infection strategy, we design a best-response estimation strategy for the network administrator. We derive conditions under which the Nash equilibria of the strategic game exist. Simulations in both synthetic and real-world networks demonstrate that our proposed infection strategy infects more nodes while maintaining the same safety margin between the true source node and the Jordan center source estimator.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing popularity of online social networks like Facebook, Twitter and Google+ [1] - [4] , more and more people are getting news and information via social networks instead of traditional media outlets. According to a study from the Pew Research Center, about 30% of Americans now get news from Facebook [5] . Due to the interactive nature of online social networks, instead of passively consuming news, half of social networks users actively share or repost news stories, images or video, and 46% of them discuss news issues within their social circles [5] . As a result, a piece of information or a rumor posted by a social network user can be reposted by other users and spread quickly on the underlying social network and reach a large number of users in a short period of time [6] - [8] . We say that such users or nodes in the network are "infected". A widely spread rumor or misinformation can lead to reputation damage [9] , political consequences [10] , and economic damage [11] . The network administrator may want to identify the rumor source in order to catch the culprit, control the damage, and counter the rumor influence. Here, the term "network administrator" is used in a very broad sense to include anyone (e.g., regulatory authorities and researchers) who has been given access to data about the network topology and infected nodes. Motivated by this, many recent research works [12] - [17] have focused on the problem of identifying rumor sources in a network under various rumor spreading models. In all these works, the rumor source is assumed to be "dumb", and whether a susceptible node becomes infected or not with the rumor follows a stochastic process that is not controlled by the rumor source. Under this simplified assumption, the works [12] - [17] show that source estimators can be constructed so that the true source can be identified with high probability to within a fixed number of hops.
In many applications, the rumor source may wish to maintain anonymity while spreading the rumor to as many users as possible. An example is the anonymous social networking app Secret [18] , which allow smart phone users to share information and repost a posting anonymously among his device contacts or Facebook friends. In February 2014, Secret was used to spread the false rumor that Evernote Corporation was going to be acquired, which prompted the CEO to subsequently issued a public denial [19] . In a more nefarious scenario, someone who wishes to manipulate the stock price of a company may spread misinformation about that company over a social network like Twitter. To avoid being caught by the regulatory authorities, he needs to design an infection strategy that on the one hand spreads the rumor to as many users as possible, while at the same time obfuscating his identity. The recent work [20] introduces a messaging protocol, which guarantees obfuscation of the source under the assumption that the network administrator utilizes the maximum likelihood (ML) estimator to identify the source, and when the underlying network is an infinite regular tree. Moreover, simulations are provided in [20] to verify the performance of the messaging protocol on irregular trees and general networks.
With prior knowledge that the rumor source may try to avoid detection, the network administrator needs to adapt its estimation strategy to increase its chance of identifying the rumor source. On the other hand, if the source has prior knowledge of the estimation strategy, it needs to further adapt its own infection strategy, and so on. The source and network administrator is thus playing a "hide and seek" game of rumor spreading and source identification. This complex dynamic can be modeled as a strategic game with the source and network administrator as the two players of the game. To the best of our knowledge, studying rumor spreading and source identification as a strategic game is novel since previous works like [12] - [17] focus only on the estimation strategy, while the work [20] focuses only on the infection strategy.
In this paper, we develop optimal strategies for both the source and network administrator for infinite trees, whereas [20] develops an order-optimal infection strategy for the source for infinite regular trees (with heuristic extensions to more general networks). In [20] , the network administrator is assumed to adopt the ML estimation strategy, whereas we assume that the network administrator is allowed to tune a Jordan center based estimation strategy (see Section II-A for justifications of our estimation strategy choice). However, our current work requires the source to know a lower bound for the observation time of the network administrator whereas the formulation in [20] does not have this constraint. An example in which our assumption applies is when a perpetrator aims to manipulate the stock price of a company just before the day of its initial public offering (IPO). He first spreads a rumor within his social network using private messages to collude with other users. Then at a specific time (e.g., the IPO day), all colluding users post the rumor publicly in order to manipulate the stock price and profit from it. Our work can also be applied to infection processes other than rumor spreading. For example, a perpetrator of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack first injects a virus into the network to compromise a large number of nodes. Then at a specific time decided by the perpetrator, the DDoS mechanism is triggered from all compromised nodes to flood the bandwidth or resources of the targeted system. Our main contributions are the following: (i) We formulate a strategic game in which the network administrator and rumor source are the players.
The network administrator uses a rumor source estimator in which it probes all the nodes within a given distance of a randomly chosen Jordan center of the observed infection graph. A larger probe or estimation radius ensures that the rumor source can be identified but incurs a higher cost. The rumor source is assumed to use an infection strategy in which the rate of infection over each edge in the network can be controlled in order to achieve a minimum safety margin to the Jordan centers.
The rumor source is rewarded for each infected node, and penalized if it is identified by the network administrator.
(ii) Given a safety margin for the rumor source, we show that the best-response strategy for the network administrator is to use the Jordan centers as the source estimator or adopt an estimation radius equal to the safety margin. We derive conditions under which each of these strategies are optimal.
(iii) Given an estimation radius for the network administrator, we show that the optimal safety margin for the rumor source when the underlying network is an infinite tree, is either zero or one more than the estimation radius. We derive an infection strategy, called the Dominant Infection Strategy (DIS), which maximizes the number of infected nodes subject to a given safety margin.
(iv) We derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium for the strategic game in (i) exists. We show that when a Nash equilibrium exists, the best response for the network administrator is to adopt the Jordan center estimator. This gives a game-theoretic interpretation to the Jordan center estimator, in addition to being a universally robust estimator (which we showed previously in [17] ).
Our problem of finding the best-response infection strategy is related to the influence maximization problem, which aims to find a subset of influential nodes to maximize the expected number of nodes that are "influenced" or infected by the chosen subset [21] , [22] , and is shown by [23] to be a NP-hard optimization problem. Approximate solutions have been extensively investigated by various researchers [24] - [26] . The main difference between our work and the influence maximization problem is that the source node in our problem is fixed, and we seek an infection strategy, given any source node, to maximize the set of infected nodes, subject to a safety margin to the Jordan center of the infection graph.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the system model, assumptions and provide a game-theoretic problem formulation. In Section III, we show the best-response estimation strategy for the network administrator given any infection strategy. In Section IV, we propose a bestresponse infection strategy for the rumor source given any estimation strategy. In Section V, we derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game exists. We present simulation results in Section VI to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies on various synthetic and real networks.
Finally we conclude and summarize in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first describe our system model and assumptions, and then we provide a gametheoretic problem formulation for the rumor spreading and source identification. April 21, 2015 DRAFT
Consider an undirected graph G(V, E) representing a social network, where V is the set of vertices or nodes, and E is the set of edges. Because of technical difficulties, our analysis and strategy design assume that G is a tree, as is commonly done in the literature [12] - [16] , [20] . We will however apply our strategies heuristically to general networks in our simulations in Section VI.
We assume that there is a single rumor source node v * ∈ V at time 0. We say that a node is infected when it has accepted the rumor, e.g., by posting the rumor using its account in the case of an online social
network. An infected node remains infected throughout, and has the capability of infecting its neighbors at a deterministic rate. For any edge (i, j) ∈ E, we let µ(i, j) to be the time it takes for an infected node i to infect its susceptible neighbor j, which we call the infection time associated with the edge (i, j). Let λ(i, j) = 1/µ(i, j) be the infection rate of (i, j) and we assume λ(i, j) is uniformly upper bounded by a maximum infection rateλ > 0. At some time t > 0, the network administrator observes one snapshot of all the infected nodes in the network, and tries to estimate the rumor source.
For any pair of nodes v and u in G, let ρ(v, u) to be the shortest path from v to u, and the infection time of ρ(v, u) to be
The collection of infection rates Λ = {λ(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ E} is called an infection strategy for the source node. Given any infection strategy Λ, we denote the set of infected nodes at time t as
Let G t to be the minimum connected subgraph of G that spans V t (Λ), which we call the infection graph at time t.
Throughout this paper, we let |X| denote the expected number of nodes in the random set X conditioned on the infection graph, and 1 A denote an indicator function with value 1 iff the clause A is true.
A. Network Administrator
At some time t > 0, the network administrator observes the infection graph G t , and tries to estimate the rumor source. We assume that t is unknown to the network administrator. We assume that the network administrator can choose a subset of nodes to investigate, which we call the suspect set. It is important for the network administrator to decide which subset of nodes to investigate in order to minimize the For any infection strategy Λ, we call the largest distanced(v, V t (Λ)) between v and any infected node the infection range of v. We let
to be the set of nodes with minimum infection range, which are known as the Jordan centers of G t [27] .
It is shown in [15] that if G is a tree, then
When no prior knowledge of the rumor source is available, any node in V t (Λ) is equally likely to be the rumor source as infection rates over different edges can be heterogeneous. Therefore, a Jordan center is a minimax source estimator that minimizes the largest distance to any infected node. It has also been shown in [15] - [17] that the Jordan center is a robust rumor source estimate. Another popular estimator is the ML estimator. However, [20] shows that it is possible to design an infection strategy so that the probability of the ML estimator being the true rumor source is approximately 1/|V t (Λ)|, i.e., all the infected nodes are considered by the network administrator to be approximately equally likely to be the source. If t is large, then the ML estimator performs badly. The Jordan center estimator does not have this problem since there are at most two Jordan centers in any tree. As such, we assume that the network administrator chooses the suspect set V sp (d a | Λ) to be the set of infected nodes within d a ≥ 0 hops from an arbitrarily chosen Jordan center u, i.e.,
We call d a the estimation radius. Note that V sp (d a | Λ) depends on the infection strategy Λ only through the infection graph V t (Λ). As we will see in the sequel, the infection strategy Λ itself need not be known to the network administrator in order to form its best response.
We let d s to be the distance between the actual rumor source and the Jordan centers, i.e.,
We call d s (Λ) the safety margin of the rumor source achieved by the infection strategy Λ.
, then the rumor source is in the suspect set, and the network administrator has a nonnegative probability of identifying the rumor source. The network administrator obtains an expected gain
, which we assume to depend only on the infection graph, and is non-increasing in d a for any given Λ. For example, if the network administrator only has access to the infection graph and has no additional prior information, its best strategy is to uniformly choose a node from the set of suspects as the estimated source node. Its expected reward is then inversely proportional to the number of nodes in V sp (d a | Λ). In another application, the network administrator may have side information that allows it to always correctly identify the source node if it is included in the suspect set. In this case, we let the expected reward to be g a (d a , Λ) = g a , independent of the estimation radius d a .
Some positive cost c a is incurred for probing or investigating each suspect node. We let the utility function of the network administrator be
We note that the network administrator's utility function depends on Λ only through its infection graph
, which the administrator observes at time t, and the safety margin d s (Λ).
To be more precise, we
, but this is avoided to reduce notation clutter.
B. Rumor Source
Suppose that the network administrator uses an estimation radius of d a ≥ 0. We assume that t is known to the rumor source. 1 For each node that is infected, the rumor source is rewarded with a gain
is incurred if it falls within the suspect set of the network administrator. We assume that c s (d a ) is a non-decreasing function of the estimation radius d a . The utility function of the rumor source adopting the infection strategy Λ is given by
C. Strategic Game
We model the rumor spreading and source identification as a strategic game where the network administrator and the rumor source are the two players. The utility functions of the two players are given in (6) and (7), respectively. Given any infection strategy Λ, the network administrator finds the best-response estimation strategy with estimation radius d * a that maximizes its utility function, i.e.,
On the other hand, given any estimation radius d a , the rumor source finds the best-response infection strategy Λ * that maximizes its utility function, i.e.,
If there exists a pair (d * a , Λ * ) such that given Λ * , the best-response estimation strategy has estimation radius d * a ; and given d * a , the best-response infection strategy is Λ * , then (d * a , Λ * ) is a Nash equilibrium of the strategic game [28] .
In Sections III and IV, we find the best-response estimation strategy and the best-response infection strategy for the network administrator and the rumor source, respectively. In Section V, we derive the Nash equilibrium of the strategic game.
III. BEST-RESPONSE ESTIMATION STRATEGY FOR THE NETWORK ADMINISTRATOR
In this section, we derive the best-response estimation strategy for the network administrator. In this paper, we assume that the network administrator utilizes the Jordan center based estimation strategy, which is characterized by the estimation radius d a . Given the infection strategy Λ with safety margin d s (Λ) = d s , the network administrator chooses an optimal estimation radius to maximize its utility function.
We first consider the case where d s = 0. In this case, the rumor source is always in the suspect set for all values of d a ≥ 0. From (6), the network administrator's utility function becomes
which is decreasing in d a . Therefore, the optimal estimation radius is given by d a = 0. Now suppose that d s > 0. We claim that the estimation radius of a best-response estimation strategy is either 0 or d s . To prove this claim, it suffices to show the following inequalities:
We first show the inequality (8). Since 0 < d ′ a < d s , for both the estimation strategy with d a = 0 and the estimation strategy with d a = d ′ a , the rumor source is not in the suspect set. Therefore, the gains for both estimation strategies are 0. The inequality (8) then holds because
We next show the inequality (9) . Since d ′ a ≥ d s +1, for both the estimation strategy with d a = d s and the estimation strategy with d a = d ′ a , the rumor source falls in the suspect set. Since 
We remind the reader that the quantities g a (d s , Λ) and V sp (d s | Λ) in Theorem 1 depend on the infection strategy Λ only through the infection graph V t (Λ) observed by the network administrator. Therefore, given the safety margin d s (Λ), the network administrator can formulate its best response using Theorem 1 upon observing the infection graph.
We observe that if d s > 0 in Theorem 1, then using an estimation radius of d * a = 0 implies that the network administrator has zero probability of identifying the rumor source. This happens when the reward of catching the rumor source is significantly lower than the cost of probing a node. For example, if g a (·, ·) = g a , then it can be shown that g a < c a implies an optimal estimation radius d * a = 0 for the network administrator. In practical systems, attempts should be made to keep the cost of probing each node in the network sufficiently small so that the rumor source can be identified with positive probability.
On the other hand, our result also points to the intuitive conclusion that for a rumor source to escape identification with probability one, the infection observation time t must be sufficiently long (cf. Theorem 2), and the source's safety margin must be chosen to be sufficiently large so that |V sp (d s | Λ)| is large and the first case in (10) holds.
IV. BEST-RESPONSE INFECTION STRATEGY FOR THE RUMOR SOURCE IN A TREE
In this section, we derive a best-response infection strategy for the rumor source for the case where the underlying graph G is a tree. In order to avoid boundary effects so as to simplify the problem, we assume that the underlying graph G is infinite, where every node has degree at least two. April 21, 2015 DRAFT Given the estimation strategy with the estimation radius d a , the rumor source designs a best-response infection strategy Λ * that maximizes its utility function. We first introduce the notion of a maximum infection strategy. For each estimation radius d a , we design a best-response infection strategy Λ * for the rumor source in two steps:
• Step 1: Given any safety margin d s constraint, we find a maximum infection strategy Λ ds ∈ M ds .
•
Step 2: Among all maximum infection strategies found in Step 1, we find one that maximizes the rumor source's utility function as the best-response infection strategy, i.e., an infection strategy
Note that under a given safety margin constraint d s , the rumor source's utility u s (·, ·) is invariant to which infection strategy is chosen from M ds . In the following, we first determine the range of values that the safety margin d s can take for a given maximum infection rateλ and infection time t, i.e., those values of d s such that M ds = ∅. We call such a safety margin feasible. It is clear that M 0 = {Λ 0 }, where Λ 0 is the infection strategy in which every node is infected at the maximum rate ofλ. We next propose an algorithm to find an infection strategy in M ds , for all feasible d s > 0.
A. Maximum Infection Strategy with Safety Margin Constraint d s
Given any observation time t, it turns out that not all values of d s are feasible. To see this, consider a rumor spreading along a linear network. Since the infection rate along each edge is upper bounded bȳ λ, the maximum number of hops the rumor can spread from the source is ⌊λt⌋, and the safety margin cannot be more than ⌊λt/2⌋. The following theorem provides the achievable upper bound for the safety margin in an infinite tree. The proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 2. Suppose the underlying graph G is an infinite tree. For any given observation time t, the upper bound of d s for any infection strategy is given bȳ
From Theorem 2, we see that d s of any infection strategy can take values only from the set [0,d s ].
Given a feasible safety margin d s , we next show how to design a maximum infection strategy Λ ds ∈ M ds .
In the rest of this paper, we adopt the following notations: Let T u to be the subtree of G t rooted at node u with the first link in the path from u to the source node v * removed. Let l u to be a leaf node in T u that has maximum distance from u, i.e.,
We start by defining a dominant path and showing an elementary result related to this definition.
Definition 2. For any observation time t, and infection graph G t , a dominant path is a path between
the source v * and any node in G t that has the longest distance.
Lemma 1. Suppose that G is an infinite tree. Consider a maximum infection strategy with a feasible safety margin d s that results in an infection graph G t . Then, the infection along all edges in any dominant path of G t has infection rateλ.
The proof of Lemma 1 is provided in Appendix B. To get a safety margin d s > 0, the intuition is to construct one dominant path P d starting at v * so that the Jordan center is biased towards the leaf node at the other end of P d , which in turn results in a safety margin d s . We discuss how to select an optimal dominant path in Algorithm 1. For now, we assume that a dominant path P d is given. Our proposed DIS strategy, given in Strategy 1, is defined by a set of parameters, {λ m : m ∈ [0, λ t − 1]}. Consider any infected node i on the path P d . Suppose d(v * , i) = m and let j be the susceptible neighboring node of i on P d . The node i infects j with rateλ and infects all its other susceptible neighbors with rate λ m . On the other hand, for any infected node that is not on P d , it infects all its susceptible neighbors with the same rate that it itself was previously infected.
In the following discussion, we show that if the parameter λ m is set to be that in (19) and the dominant path is selected by Algorithm 1, then DIS is a maximum infection strategy with safety margin d s .
Suppose that v * has k neighbors v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v k in G t , where k ≥ 2. Without loss of generality, suppose that the labels are assigned so that
We have the following elementary result, the proof of which is provided in Appendix C. (19) , and a dominant path P d found by Algorithm 1.
2: Output: λ(i, j), the infection rate for every (i, j) ∈ G t .
3: For any node i ∈ V \{v * }, let pa(i) to be the node that infects i.
4: for each i ∈ V do 5:
If j is the susceptible neighboring node of i on P d , set λ(i, j) =λ.
7:
For any other susceptible neighbor j ′ of i not on P d , set λ(i, j ′ ) = λ m , where m = d(v * , i).
8:
For any susceptible neighbor j of i, set λ(i, j) = λ(pa(i), i). 
Lemma 2. Suppose that G is an infinite tree. Given an infection graph
then at least one end of any diameter of G t is in the subtree T v1 .
We now show how to find the optimal parameter λ m in DIS so that it achieves a safety margin d s .
From Lemma 1, we have
Let l v1 be a leaf node so that
. Similar to the definition in (12) , letl um be a leaf node inT um that has maximum distance from u m . Figure 1 shows an illustration of G t andT um .
Node u m receives the rumor at time m/λ. After that, all nodes inT um is infected by rate λ m , yielding
Let D(u m ) to be the set of longest paths such that one end of any path D(u m ) ∈ D(u m ) is l v1 and the other end is inT um . From (13) and (14), the number of vertices in
Letv(u m ) to be a node in the middle of
Since the rumor is propagated at the maximum rateλ along P d , we can always choosev(u m ) ∈ P d and
In order to maximize the number of infected nodes, we maximize |D(u m )|. Note that |D(u m )| is odd, because otherwise we can always increase λ m so that we have one more node in |D(u m )|, but (16) remains the same. Then we have
Since 
2: Use the Bellman-Ford algorithm [29] to find a maximal weighted path (u 0 , . . . , u ⌊λt⌋ ) starting at u 0 = v * . The maximal weighted path is output as the dominant path.
To maximize the number of infected nodes at time t, we choose each λ m to be as large as possible.
Therefore, for m ∈ [0, d s ], we choose λ m to be the largest value so that equality holds in (18), while
Note that with this choice,v(u m ) is the Jordan center on P d for all
. In summary, we can choose λ m to bē
for each m ∈ [0, ⌊λt⌋ − 1]. We have the following result. The proof is provided in Appendix D.
Lemma 3. Suppose that DIS with safety margin d s > 0 has the dominant path P d . Then, it maximizes the number of infected nodes amongst all infection strategies with safety margin d s and dominant path
In the following, we show how to find the optimal dominant path. Given any dominant path P d = (u 0 = v * , . . . , u ⌊λt⌋ ) as an input of DIS with safety margin d s > 0, we have from (19) , that the number of infected nodes is given by
To find an optimal dominant path so that the above sum is maximized, we can use the procedure in Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, since the weight we have assigned to each edge (u m , u m+1 ) in the maximal weight path found corresponds exactly to |T um | in (20) , the algorithm gives us the optimal dominant path. In the April 21, 2015 DRAFT first step of Algorithm 1, the weights w(u, w) for all neighbors w of u in T u can be found by performing another breadth-first search in the tree T u . The time complexity of the first step is thus O(n 2 ), 2 where n is the number of vertices within a distance λ t of v * [29] . The Bellman-Ford algorithm in the second step also has time complexity O(n 2 ). Therefore, the overall time complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(n 2 ). 
B. Infinite Regular Trees
In the following, we consider the special case where the underlying network is an infinite r-regular tree, every node has r > 2 neighboring nodes. The fastest infection strategy Λ 0 is the one that sets all infection rates to beλ. Without loss of generality, suppose thatλ = 1. Then the number of nodes infected by the fastest infection strategy by time t can be shown to be given by
This infection strategy has safety margin 0. Now suppose that the rumor source wishes to achieve a safety margin d s ≤d s in (11), the set of infected nodes by time t by our proposed DIS strategy can be shown to be all nodes with distance not greater than t − d s from the Jordan center JC t (DIS) as shown in Fig. 2 . Then, the number of nodes infected by time t by our proposed DIS strategy is
When d s increases, the radius t − d s decreases, and the number of nodes infected by the maximum infection strategy decreases. This is the necessary trade-off between the faster rumor spreading speed and the larger safety margin of the rumor source.
The paper [20] proposes a messaging protocol called adaptive diffusion (AD) under the assumption that the network administrator utilizes a ML estimation strategy. AD is a stochastic infection strategy, where its safety margin falls in the range [1, ⌊t/2⌋] with probability one. Given any safety margin d s ∈ [1, ⌊t/2⌋], with probability one, the set of infected nodes by time t by AD can be shown to be all nodes with distance not greater than ⌊t/2⌋ from the Jordan center JC t (AD) as shown in Fig. 2 . Then, the number of nodes |V t (AD)| infected by AD by time t satisfies the following bound with probability one:
Therefore, our proposed strategy DIS infects at least as many nodes as the strategy AD almost surely. 
C. Best-response Infection Strategy for the Rumor Source
Proof: From (19), the infection rate λ m is a non-increasing function of the safety margin. Since 
which completes the proof of Lemma 4.
We now derive the best-response infection strategy based on Theorem 3 and Lemma 4. Assume that the estimation radius d a is known. We first consider the case where d a ≥d s . Since no infection strategies have safety margins greater thand s , the rumor source always falls in the suspect set of the network administrator. As a result, the cost c s (d a ) is always incurred. Therefore, to maximize its utility function, the rumor source maximizes its reward g s |V t (Λ)| by maximizing the number of infected nodes |V t (Λ)|. Theorem 3 and Lemma 4 then leads to the conclusion that Λ 0 is a best-response infection strategy.
Next, consider the case where d a <d s . We claim that a best-response infection strategy is either Λ 0 or Λ da+1 . Following Theorem 3, it suffices to prove the claim by showing the following inequalities:
We first show the inequality (21) 
shows that the inequality (22) holds. This complete the proof for the claim. The following theorem now follows immediately.
Theorem 4. Suppose that G is an infinite tree. Then, for any estimation radius d a ≥ 0, a best-response infection strategy for the rumor source is given by
where
V. NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN A TREE
In Section III, we derived the best-response estimation strategy under the assumption that the network administrator knows the safety margin used by the rumor source. In Section IV, we derived the bestresponse infection strategy under the assumption that the rumor source knows the estimation radius used by the network administrator. In these best-response strategies, the network administrator or rumor source do not change their respective strategies knowing their counter-party's best responses. In the following, we now derive conditions under which a Nash equilibrium for the strategic game played by the network administrator and the rumor source exists. We also derive explicitly their respective strategies at these Nash equilibria.
Theorem 5. Suppose G is an infinite tree, andd s in (11) is greater than 0. Then, the strategic game of rumor spreading and source identification (6)- (7) has the following properties:
(c) No other Nash equilibria exist.
and is non-increasing in d a for all infection strategies Λ, then the sum utility of the two players is maximized at the strategy pairs
The proof of Theorem 5 is provided in Appendix E. From Theorem 5, when a Nash equilibrium exists, whether a rumor source is identified with positive probability or not depends on the relative gains and costs of the two players. It is interesting to note that if a Nash equilibrium exists, then the strategy of the network administrator in equilibrium has d a = 0, which corresponds to the Jordan center estimator.
This shows that under the technical conditions given in Theorem 5, the natural rumor source estimator to use is the Jordan center estimator, instead of probing a neighborhood set of the Jordan centers.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to evaluate the performance of our proposed infection and estimation strategies. We first compare DIS with AD, and then show the behavior of the best-response infection and estimation strategies under different gains and costs.
A. Number of Infected Nodes
We first evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed DIS algorithm in infecting nodes. To adapt DIS for general networks, we first find a breadth-first search tree rooted at the rumor source and then apply DIS on this tree. We perform simulations on three kinds of networks: random trees where each node has a degree uniformly drawn from the set {2, 3}, the western states power grid network of the United States [30] containing 4941 nodes, and a part of the Facebook network with 4039 nodes [31] . The benchmark we compare against is the AD infection strategy proposed in [20] , where AD is shown to be order-optimal for the source for infinite regular trees (with heuristic extensions to more general networks). Without loss of generality, we let t to be even andλ = 1 in the simulations. Given any observation time t, the safety margin d s (AD) resulting from the AD falls in the range [1, t/2] with probability one, and the set of infected nodes at time t is
whereṽ is picked uniformly at random from the set of nodes in G with distance d s (AD) from the rumor source v * .
We let the observation time t to be 14, 14, and 6 for random trees, the power grid network and the Facebook network, respectively. The observation time for the Facebook network is chosen to be relatively small because the network is highly connected with a average pairwise distance of only 5.5 hops. The safety margin requirement d s is set to be 1, 2, · · · , t/2, respectively. We run 1000 simulation runs for each kind of network and each value of d s . Fig. 3 shows the average number of infected nodes for both DIS and AD. As expected, we see that there is a trade off for DIS between the number of infected nodes and the safety margin. We also see that DIS consistently infects more nodes than AD.
B. Best-response Infection Strategy
We then evaluate the proposed best-response infection strategy on random trees and the Facebook network. For simplicity, we assume that g a (·, ·) = g a and c s (·) = c s for the rest of this section. For each
, whered s = t/2, the best-response infection strategy is given by Theorem 4. We fix the gain g s for all cases and vary the cost c s to make it low, medium and high, compared to g s . Fig. 4 . Average utility of the best-response infection strategies for the rumor source. When cs is low, DIS0 is the best-response infection strategy for all da. When cs is high, DIS da+1 are the best-response infection strategies for da <ds, and DIS0 is the best-response infection strategy for da =ds. When cs is medium, DIS da+1 are the best-response infection strategies for da ≤ 2 for random trees and da ≤ 1 for Facebook network, respectively, and DIS0 is the best-response infection strategy for other values of da.
for Facebook network. Let DIS ds denote the DIS strategy with safety margin constraint d s . We run 1000 simulation runs for each setting and plot the average utility of the best-response infection strategies for the rumor source in Fig. 4 . We observe the following from Fig. 4 .
• When the cost c s is low compared to the gain g s , the rumor source always chooses DIS 0 as its infection strategy. As a result, the rumor source is identified by the network administrator. However, it maximizes its reward by infecting the most number of nodes.
• When the cost c s is high compared to the gain g s , the rumor source chooses DIS da+1 for d a <d s to ensure that the network administrator does not identify it, and chooses DIS 0 for d a =d s as it can not find any infection strategy with a safety margin greater thand s (cf. Theorem 2).
• When the cost c s is medium compared to the gain g s , the rumor source chooses DIS da+1 when d a is small. As d a increases, the rumor source switches to DIS 0 as its infection strategy.
C. Best-response Estimation Strategy
Lastly, we evaluate the proposed best-response estimation strategy on random trees and Facebook network. Given any infection strategy Λ with safety margin
the best-response estimation strategy is given by Theorem 1. We fix the cost c a for all cases and vary the gain g a to make it low, medium and high, compared to c a . Specifically, we set g a to be c a , 50c a and 200c a for random trees, and c a , 500c a and 2000c a for Facebook network. We run 1000 simulation runs for each setting and plot the average utility of the best-response estimation strategies for the network administrator in Fig. 5 . We observe the following from . Average utility of the best-response estimation strategies for the network administrator. When ga is low, da is chosen to be 0 for all ds. When ga is high, da is chosen to be ds for all ds. When ga is medium, da is set to be ds for ds ≤ 4 for random trees and ds ≤ 1 for Facebook network, respectively, and da is set to be 0 for other values of ds.
• When the gain g a is low compared to the cost c a , the network administrator always chooses d a to be 0 to minimize the cost. As a result, the rumor source gets caught only when d s = 0.
• When the gain g a is high compared to the cost c a , the network administrator always chooses d a to be d s . As a result, the overall cost increases with d s as more nodes need to be investigated, which in turn decreases the utility of the network administrator. Moreover, the rumor source always gets caught in this case.
• When the gain g a is medium compared to the cost c a , the network administrator chooses d a to be d s when d s is small and the gain of identifying the rumor source is higher than the cost of investigating more nodes. When d s increases to a point that the increase in cost of investigating |V sp (d a | Λ)| − 1 more nodes exceeds the gain of identifying the rumor source, the network administrator chooses d a to be 0.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have formulated the problems of maximizing rumor spreading and source identification in a social network as a strategic game. Conditioned on the strategy of the other player, we proposed best-response strategies for both the rumor source and the network administrator in a tree network. We also derived conditions under which a Nash equilibrium exists. In all Nash equilibria, the Jordan center estimator is the equilibrium estimation strategy for the network administrator. We showed that the sum utility of both players is maximized at one of these Nash equilibria.
In this work, we have assumed that the underlying network is an infinite tree. Simulation results suggest that the proposed strategies also perform well on general networks. However, obtaining theoretical results for general networks seems unlikely due to difficulties in designing an optimal infection strategy in a loopy graph. Future work includes designing best-response strategies for the network administrator under a more general class of estimation strategies that may not be based on the Jordan center. It would also be of interest to study the best-response infection and estimation strategies when infection rates are stochastic and not fully controllable by the rumor source, or when additional side information is available to the network administrator.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We prove Theorem 2 in two steps. We first show that there exists at least one infection strategy that can achieve d s =d s . We then show that there is no infection strategy that results in d s >d s .
Step 1: We only need to find one infection strategy, which does not need to be optimal by any mean, , if ⌊λt⌋ is odd = ⌊λt⌋ 2 =d s .
Step 2: Assume d s >d s , i.e., d s ≥d s + 1. Consider any infection strategy Λ and a Jordan center
where l 1 and l 2 are leaf nodes, with
shown that d(l 1 , u) and d(l 2 , u) differs in value by at most 1 [16] . We then have We call the leaf node l d of a dominant path a dominant leaf. We prove Lemma 1 in two steps. We first
show that any diameter D of G t contains at least one dominant leaf. We then show that the infection rate associated with each edge in any dominant path isλ.
Step 1: Show that any diameter D of G t contains at least one dominant leaf.
Let l 1 and l 2 to be the two end nodes of D. Let v i and v j to be two different neighboring nodes of v * . We consider two possible scenarios: l 1 and l 2 are in different subtrees T vi and T vj , respectively; l 1 and l 2 are in the same subtree T vi .
SCENARIO 1: l 1 and l 2 are in different subtrees T vi and T vj , respectively.
Suppose D does not contain any dominant leaf. Then we can find a dominant path ρ(v * , l d ) such that
∈ T vj and just exchange the notations i and j). Consider the path
Thus, we find a path D ′ that has longer distance than the diameter D, a contradiction. So D must contain at least one dominant leaf. D. We now consider the case where l d ∈ T vi . Let u x to be the first node on which the two paths ρ(l 1 , v * ) and ρ(l 2 , v * ) intersects, where x is the depth of u x and 1
Then let u y to be the first node on which the two paths ρ(l 1 , v * ) and ρ(l d , v * ) intersects, where y is the depth of Figure 6 shows all three possible cases: y > x, y = x and y < x. Consider
For case 1 and case 2 in Figure 6 , we have
. Similarly, for case 3 in Figure 6 , we have
As a result, for all three cases, we have
We find a path D ′ that has longer distance than the diameter D, a contradiction. We can now conclude that any diameter D of G t contains at least one dominant leaf.
Step 2: Show that the infection rate associated with each edge in any dominant path isλ.
Consider any dominant path 
in turn suggests that u ∈ ρ(u x , l d ). If we increase the infection rates of all edges in P d toλ, the length of P d will increase and u will move further away from v * , i.e., the safety margin will increase as well.
We can then increase the infection rates of some edges in the path ρ(u x , l 2 ) to increase the length of ρ(u x , l 2 ), as a result, u will move closer to v * and the safety margin can reduce back to the original We first consider case (1) and let l 1 and l 2 to be the two ends of D. Consider two paths ρ(l 1 , v * ) and ρ(l 2 , v * ) and let the first node on which these two paths intersect as w. We can find a path D ′ = {l v1 , · · · , v * , · · · , w, · · · , l 2 } that has longer distance than D. We have
Then we have
We find a path that has greater length than the diameter, which contradicts with the definition of diameter.
This completes the proof for case (1).
We then consider case (2) . Fix i and j, and let l i and l j denote the two ends of the diameter in subtree We first prove the properties (a)-(c) in sequence. We then prove the sum utility optimality claim.
Proof of Theorem 5(a).
Following the definition of the Nash equilibrium, it suffices to show that
u s (0, Λ 0 ) ≥ u s (0, Λ), ∀Λ.
The inequality (23) The proof of Theorem 5(a) is now complete.
Proof of Theorem 5(b).
It again suffices to show that for Λ 1 ∈ M 1 satisfying the assumptions of Theorem 5(b), we have We have now shown that (26) holds and the proof of Theorem 5(b) is complete.
Proof of Theorem 5(c).
Consider any strategy pair 
